This study presents new estimates of economic impacts of climate change for Italy and other countries, obtained with a full-fledged Integrated Assessment Model (ENVISAGE), developed at the World Bank. This model is qualitatively superior to other models used in the past for the same purpose. It is found out that climate change is expected to reduce the Italian GDP in 2050, with respect to a reference baseline, by -0.31%. This figure is about two times higher than previous estimates. Declining tourism demand is the main driver of negative effects on GDP, as Italy would become less attractive as a tourist destination. By the end of the century, however, Italy would also experience severe losses in agricultural production, due to increased temperature and reduced water availability. Even if Italy will notably be affected by climate change, in the absence of any mitigation or adaptation effort, other countries in the Mediterranean will experience larger economic impacts. This is the case of Spain and Middle East -North Africa.
Introduction and Motivation
Understanding the nature and consequences of climate change is at the basis of any serious mitigation or adaptation policy. Mitigation means curbing climate change, whereas adaptation means reducing the costs of climate change. In both cases, it is important to assess what would be the costs of inaction, that is, the economic impact of climate change in a baseline scenario, in which no policies are implemented.
Avoiding the environmental and socio-economic damages on human health and welfare is the ultimate justification of more stringent climate policies. The knowledge, as precise as possible, of the monetary benefits associated with avoiding those damages indeed provides one of the crucial elements, together with costs, of the climate policy equation. This task has been keeping environmental economists quite busy in developing appropriate methodologies, producing the necessary data, and designing and simulating suitable climate-economy models. As documented in the contribution of Working Group II (WGII) to the last IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) (Parry et al., 2007) , the state of the art is nowadays represented by soft-linking simulation models of the evolution of global climate, the physical impacts of climate alterations, and the translation of those impacts into socio-economic consequences, expressed in monetary terms.
In this context, it is important to understand that climate change will produce very different effects in several dimensions (sea level rise, tourism, etc.), and each effect should be separately addressed and modelled in a comprehensive framework. Furthermore, climate change will bring about very different (sometimes positive) impacts in various regions and economic sectors. To capture this, an integrated assessment model should combine a systemic approach with a sufficiently high level of disaggregation.
One of the chapters of the WGII volume of the IPCC AR4 was devoted to Europe, for the first time documenting a wide range of climate impacts for the "old continent". Climate change is expected to pose challenges to many European economic sectors and to alter the distribution of economic activity. In order to effectively design adaptation plans and response strategies, estimates of impacts at the national, and possibly regional and industrial level, are necessary. In September 2007, the Italian Ministry of the Environment organized a conference in Rome, to present and discuss available evidence of climate change impacts for Italy (Carraro, 2008) . Results obtained with a CGE model, similar to the one used in PESETA, were presented there (Eboli et al., 2008) . That model accounts for impacts on health, agriculture, tourism, energy demand, sea level rise and increased desertification. Over the period 2001-2050 the estimated annual loss of Italian GDP would be between 0.12-0.16% if temperature increases by 0.93°C (cumulatively 0.12-0.19%) or between 0.16-0.20% if the increase would be +1,2°C (cumulatively 0.20-0.38%). This would translate into a welfare reduction, in 2050, of about 20-30 billions Euro at current prices.
This work presents new estimates of economic impacts of climate change for Italy, and compares them with those of some neighboring countries in the Mediterranean region. Quality of results is much superior to that of the previous estimates, for various reasons. First, instead of using a static CGE model, a full-fledged dynamic integrated assessment model, coupling a climate module with a sophisticated CGE framework, is used (Note 4). Second, the model runs, at different time intervals, up to the year 2100, bringing about more accurate figures when future impacts are discounted at present time. Third, additional impacts are considered, notably those on water availability (obviously important for the MED) and heat effects on labor productivity (Note 5).
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the model structure and how different climate impacts have been introduced in it. Section 3 presents the results for Italy, whereas Section 4 compares them with those of other countries in the MED region, exploring also the distributional implications. A final section provides some concluding remarks.
of sea level rise), or parameters, like factor or multi-factor productivity (e.g., in the case of agricultural yield). In a few instances, for example in energy demand changes due to varying needs for cooling/heating, impacts affect naturally endogenous variables, like household energy consumption, through shifting factors in the demand equations.
We consider here the following climate change impacts:  Agricultural yields  Sea level rise  Water availability  Tourist arrivals  Energy demand (cooling / heating)  Health effects  Heat-related labor productivity
The current version of the model does not account for other impacts, such as effects of forestry, ecosystems and biodiversity, extreme weather and catastrophic events. We now describe how each impact has been modelled and how parameters have been estimated.
Agriculture
Variations in agricultural yield are modelled as changes in multifactor productivity for agricultural activities. Parameters were obtained through elaboration from data presented in the IPCC AR4 report (Easterling et al., 2007) , where a meta-analysis can be found, summarizing results from many different studies. Central values for 1, 3 and 5 degrees changes were collected for three crops (maize, wheat, rice) and for high and low latitudes regions, to estimate parameters of a second-degree polynomial. Table 2 summarizes the central estimates for a three 3°C variation in local mean temperature, under the scenario "with adaptation" (Note 7). Region-specific parameters for the impact function in this study were obtained through (i) a weighted average of crop functions, with weights given by the relative share of each crop in total regional output, as well as by the relative allocation of each region in the two areas (high and low latitudes), and (ii) by forcing the function to be zero for zero changes in temperature.
Sea Level Rise
Sea level rise is modelled through reductions in available stocks of capital and land. Parameters were estimated for a static CGE model (Bosello et al., 2007) from simulation results of the DIVA model, which is also used in the PESETA study (Vafeidis et al., 2008) . Although the effects of sea level can be dramatic in some specific areas, the amount of land and capital endowments lost in large regions, like those considered in the present study, is generally limited. Some exceptions are the Rest of East Asia (XEA) region, where about 0.87% of land and capital stocks are lost for 1°C degree increase in temperature, and the Rest of South Asia (XSA), where the loss is restricted to 0.35%.
Water
Water availability affects multifactor productivity (yield) in agriculture. It is assumed that changes in productivity depend on changes in Mean Annual Runoff (MAR) in each country, with effects depending on how much each region is constrained by its water resources. This is estimated on the basis of the current ratio between water demand and available surface water.
2050 according to two different climate GCM models (a simple average of the two scenarios was used here), are taken from Strzepek and Boehlert (2009) . For the regional aggregation used in this study, we estimate a strong negative effect of reduced water availability for the Middle East and North Africa (-8.13% change in agriculture productivity for a one degree increase in temperature) and a positive effect for China (CHN), India (IND), and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).
Tourism
Changes in tourism flows, due to variations in climate conditions, are modelled as adjustments in international income transfers, to account for changes in the expenditure of incoming or outgoing tourists. Parameters for tourism have been derived from the Hamburg Tourism Model (Hamilton et al., 2005) as described in Berrittella, Bigano, . Positive income transfers are estimated for the United States (becoming, all else equal, a more attractive tourism destination), whereas negative effects are particularly felt in African countries.
Energy Demand
A model of household energy demand by fuel type has been estimated by DeCian, Lanzi and Roson (2007) using econometric techniques and a global panel data base. Energy demand is taken to depend, among other factors, on seasonal average temperatures. By increasing exogenous temperatures, in all seasons, by 1°C, it is possible to estimate the implied (long-run) change in energy demand, for electricity, gas, and oil products consumption. For most of the regions, climate change is estimated to reduce total energy demand by households, as reduced warming needs more than compensate the increased cooling needs. However, some regions do experience an increase in energy demand. These are: Rest of East Asia (XEA), India (IND), Rest of South Asia (XSA) and Brazil (BRA).
Human Health
Bosello, study the economic impacts of climate-induced change in human health, viz. cardiovascular and respiratory disorders, diarrhea, malaria, dengue fever and schistosomiasis. Changes in morbidity and mortality are interpreted as changes in labor productivity and demand for health care and are used to shock exogenous parameters in a CGE model including 16 regions. The same variations in labor productivity are used here and are applied to all countries inside the same macro-region.
Changes can be both positive and negative. Positive variations of labor productivity are expected when climate change reduces the incidence of some diseases, for example cold-related. Positive effects are estimated for China (CHN), Russia (RUS), and other regions. Negative and significant effects, however, are estimated for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), Middle East and North Africa (MNA), India (IND), Rest of South (XSA) and East (XEA) Asia, United States (USA) and Rest of the World (XLC).
Labour Productivity
We consider the ability to work under different climate conditions. Increased temperature and humidity reduce the labor productivity in a number of occupations, requiring open air activity. Kiellstrom, Kovats, Lloyd, Holt, and Tol (2008) estimate the direct impact of climate change on regional labor productivity. These results have been elaborated to get estimates of variations in labor productivity for 1°C increase in temperature and for 10 macro-regions.
Variations of labor productivity are always negative and especially significant in China (CHN), India (IND) and in most developing countries, where the incidence of agriculture and other open-air activities is relatively larger.
Simulation Results: Italy vs. Rest of the World
We present the simulation results in terms of comparison between two scenarios: a business-as-usual case without climate change impacts, and a counter-factual case where impacts are included. In both settings policy interventions (related or unrelated to climate change) are not simulated, nor are technical changes and adaptation measures beyond substitution processes in production and consumption.
The exercise entails two simulation runs. First, a baseline is built by running the recursive dynamic model with endogenous capital accumulation and labor productivity, so that the model is forced to reproduce given (econometrically estimated) scenarios of economic growth for each region. Subsequently, holding labor productivity exogenous, climate change impacts are introduced, affecting equilibrium at all time steps, on the basis of the damage functions described above.
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0.12-0.16%, depending on the climate scenario. As seen in Table 3 the estimated reduction at 2050 stemming from the ENVISAGE model is -0.31%, which is consistent with the much higher mean temperature variation (Note 10). Eboli, Parrado and Roson (ibid.) also provided estimates of the annualized impact over the whole century. However, having only one observation point (2050), they simply assumed that the damage evolved quadratically or exponentially. In the present ENVISAGE simulation exercise we can instead trace the variation at a much finer scale, allowing us to get a much more precise estimate (Note 11). Despite the higher values for the year 2050, this study produces lower estimates for the climate change impacts in terms of real GDP. This is due to the much different time profile, with some gains for the Italian economy at the beginning of the century, followed by losses, rising, however, less than exponentially. This implies lower annualized values, particularly when high discount rates are adopted.
By running model simulations with a subset of exogenous shocks, it is possible to decompose the contribution of each factor to the overall result. Figure 2 shows the variation of Italian real GDP in 2050 and 2100, obtained by assessing, in different simulations, the effects of impacts in energy demand, sea level rise, tourism, agriculture (including water) and labor productivity (including health).
Figure 2. Decomposition of effects for Italian real GDP
The first bar indicates the overall deviation in real GDP as in Table 3 . The second bar, which actually cannot be distinguished, would show the variations in real GDP induced solely by changes in the consumption demand for energy. The third bar highlights the contribution of land and capital losses due to sea level rise. The fourth bar shows the tourism impacts. As a consequence of climate change, Italy is expected to lose some attractiveness as a tourist destination. Given the share of tourism in the national economy, the impact is quite significant and negative, contributing to more than -1% of real GDP in 2100. The fifth bar refers to agriculture impacts, including variations in yield for different climate conditions and varying water availability. Interestingly, it is the only type of impact whose sign changes during the century. It is known that limited increases of carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere may generate a fertilization effect, although there is no general consensus about how relevant this effect may be. For higher GHG concentrations and temperatures, however, yields are diminished and more water is needed. Unfortunately, most regional climate models predict significant reductions of precipitations in the Mediterranean basin. This explains why, by the end of the century, agricultural impacts on real GDP, despite the quite low share of the agricultural sector in the Italian economy, are large and negative. The sixth bar refers to impacts on labor productivity, including variations in working hours due to health conditions and direct effects of heat on labor productivity. The latter effect is very small for Italy, whereas it is one of the main impact factors in developing countries. Health effects are related to changing incidence of cold-related, heat-related and vector-borne diseases. Again, the latter class is irrelevant for Italy. It turns out that the reduction of cold-related diseases more than compensate the increase in heat-related diseases in the labor force, which amounts to an increase in labor productivity and real income.
In addition to results in terms of GDP, ENVISAGE produces results about industrial production volumes, relative prices, trade flows, consumption patterns, and several other variables. It may be interesting to see how the productive structure of the Italian economy is supposed to vary. Figure 3 plots the changes in industrial production volumes for the two reference years 2050 and 2100. The most dramatic effect is felt in agriculture, with physical production volumes dropping by more than 50% by the end of the century. This effect was not highlighted in the Eboli, Parrado, and Roson (2008) , as that study stopped at 2050 and considered only mild gains in agricultural productivity. The findings for other industries are more similar. Both studies predict lower production volumes for energy and service industries, and some increases for manufacturing. Energy production is lower because of lower demand. On the other hand, falling agricultural production is likely to be accompanied by rising imports of foods, to be paid through additional exports of manufactured goods. In turn, this is made possible by a real devaluation, reducing purchasing power and production in non-traded services.
Simulation Results: Italy vs. Rest of the Mediterranean
How Italy would score, in comparison with other Mediterranean countries? We contrast here results for Italy with results obtained for two other regions: Spain, a country similar to Italy in terms of development and representative of Northern Mediterranean, and Middle East -North Africa (MENA), a composite aggregate of countries, representative of Southern Mediterranean (Note 12).
The variation in the real GDP in 2050 and 2100 of Spain is broadly similar to that of Italy, in terms of structure, although some differences can be noted. If we look at the sign of the changes in the various impacts for Spain in Figure 4 we notice that sea level rise effects are nearly absent. Another relevant difference refers to agriculture: the GDP change due to this effect is negative both in 2050 and in 2100 and quite sizeable at the end of the century. This impact is responsible for an overall negative impact of climate change that is larger for Spain than for Italy. AGRIC PFOOD COAL C-OIL GAS R-OIL PMM OT_MAN COAL-E GAS-E HYDRO-E NUC-E OTH-E GAS-D TRANS SERV Figure 4 . Decomposition of effects for Spanish real GDP For MENA, the overall loss in real GDP is about six-fold in 2050 and nine-fold in 2100 relative to Spain. These proportions should be further multiplied by a factor three, if comparison is made with Italy (see Table 3 ). Thus impacts of climate change are much more severe on the southern shore of the Mediterranean, confirming that much of the (economic) burden of climate change is likely to be felt on developing countries. In the MENA region, individual impacts on GDP are all negative: in addition to a negative effect on agriculture, the most serious impact is on labour productivity, but also sea level rise and tourism contribute to the drop in GDP. These results suggest that climate change will create serious distributional issues in the world, with broader income differences between rich and poor countries (in the Mediterranean, between northern and southern countries). To highlight this aspect, we took results from simulations with ENVISAGE to build Gini indices of inequality for some groups of countries (Note 13). Figure 6 present plots of these indices over time (Note 14).
For the Mediterranean, the Gini index steadily grows, confirming the widening of per-capita income differentials in the area. The evolution of the Mediterranean index looks quite similar to the American one. Interestingly, the analogous index built for the European Union display little growth at the beginning of the century, but later it increases in a more than proportional way, whereas no significant distributional effects are detected for Europe at large. Therefore, climate change is expected to widen income differences between southern and northern Mediterranean, as well as between South and North Europe, but some convergence in income levels between Eastern and Western Europe is also expected. Figure 3 and display variations in industrial production volumes for 2050 and 2100. As it was the case for Italy, the most dramatic effect is felt in agriculture, with physical production volumes dropping by almost 80% by the end of the century. Interestingly, Spain is quantitatively similar to MENA as far as this impact is concerned, instead of Italy. The other similarity worth pointing out between Spain and MENA is the loss of food production, unlike Italy. Finally, almost all production sectors in MENA appear to be adversely affected by climate change in a non-negligible way, with the exception of other manufacturing production and services. 
Concluding Remarks
This study presented new estimates of economic impacts of climate change for Italy and other countries, obtained with a full-fledged Integrated Assessment Model (ENVISAGE), developed at the World Bank. This model is qualitatively superior to other models used in the past for the same purpose, in particular to the model used by Eboli, Parrado and Roson (2008) , who carried out a similar exercise. We found out that climate change is expected to reduce the Italian GDP in 2050, with respect to a reference baseline, by -0.31%. This figure is about two times higher than the one estimated by Eboli, Parrado and Roson. However, as the drop in GDP, in percentage terms, does not increase significantly over time, annualized GDP losses are lower in this study.
Declining tourism demand is the main driver of the negative effect on GDP, as Italy would become less attractive as a tourist destination. By the end of the century, however, Italy would also experience severe losses in agricultural production, due to increased temperature and reduced water availability.
Even if Italy will notably be affected by climate change, in the absence of any mitigation or adaptation effort, other countries in the Mediterranean will experience larger economic impacts. This is the case of Spain, where losses in agriculture would be pronounced, but much more so this would be the case of Middle East and countries of the southern shore of the Mediterranean. The latter countries, as other developing countries in the world, are likely to suffer huge losses. Without active climate policies, income differentials will widen in the Mediterranean, but also within the European Union.
would also be seen as positive.
Note 7. At present, estimates of climate change on agricultural productivity vary considerably, depending on many specific assumption (see, e.g., Cline, 2007) . For this reason, we prefer to rely on meta-analyses, encompassing a wide range of models and approaches. 
Appendix: A Cursory Description of the ENVISAGE Model
The results in this paper rely on the World Bank's Environmental Impact and Sustainability Applied General Equilibrium (ENVISAGE) Model (Note 15). The ENVISAGE model's core is a relatively standard recursive dynamic global general equilibrium (CGE) model. Incorporated with the core CGE model is a greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions module that is connected to a simple climate module that converts emissions into atmospheric concentrations, radiative forcing and changes in mean global temperature. The climate module has feedback on the economic model through so-called damage functions, affecting a number of parameters in the model. The combination of the socio-economic CGE model with the climate module is commonly referred to an integrated assessment model (IAM).
ENVISAGE is calibrated to Release 7.1 of the GTAP dataset with a 2004 base year. It has been used to simulate dynamic scenarios through 2100. The 112 countries/regions and 57 sectors of GTAP are aggregated to a smaller set of countries/regions and sectors to facilitate computing. In the current version of the present study the model is run under the regional and sectoral breakdown presented in the table below.
The GTAP data is supplemented with satellite accounts that include emissions of the so-called Kyoto gases-carbon dioxide (CO 2 ), methane (CH 4 ), nitrous oxide (N 2 O) and hydrofluorocarbons (F-gases), different electricity production activities (coal, oil and gas, hydro, nuclear and other), and potential land and hydro supplies.
Within each time period a full equilibrium is achieved given the fixed regional endowments, technology and consumer preferences. Production is modelled as a series of nested constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) functions that are designed to reflect the substitution and complementarity of inputs. Unlike many standard models, energy plays a key role as an input and is modelled as a complement to capital in the short-run but a substitute to capital in the long run. This reflects the putty/clay specification of production that incorporates vintage capital. The key assumption is that there is greater substitution across inputs in the long run (i.e. with new capital) than in the short run (with old or installed) capital. One consequence of this specification is that countries that have higher growth and higher rates of investment typically have a more flexible economy in the aggregate. There is a single representative household that consumes goods and services, and saves. The saving rate is partially a function of the demographic structure of the region. Savings rise as either the elderly or youth dependency ratios fall. Investment is savings driven. Aggregate public expenditures are typically fixed as a share of total GDP and revenues adjust to maintain fiscal balance (through a lump sum tax on households). Other model closures for the public sector are possible.
minor since public and foreign savings are fixed and household savings will be relatively stable relative to income. The third closure rule is that the capital account is balanced. Ex ante changes in the trade balance are therefore offset through real exchange rate effects. A positive rise in net transfers, for example through a cap and trade scheme, would tend to lead to a real exchange rate appreciation.
The model dynamics are relatively straightforward. Population and labor force growth rates are based on the UN population's projection -with the growth in the labor force equated to the growth of the working age population (15-64). Investment, as mentioned above, is savings driven and the latter is partially influenced by demographics. Productivity growth in the baseline is 'calibrated' to achieve a target growth path for per capita incomes-differentiated for agriculture, manufacturing and services.
Emissions of GHGs have three drivers. Most are generated through consumption of goods-either in intermediate of final demand-for example the combustion of fossil fuels. Some are driven by the level of factor input-for example methane produced by rice is linked to the amount of cultivated land. And the remainder is generated by aggregate output-for example waste-based methane emissions. The climate module takes as inputs emissions of GHGs and converts them to atmospheric concentration, then radiative forcing and finally temperature change. The temperature change is linked back to the socio-economic model through damage functions.
